Everything sgcCrypto does, mapped across the 43 units on disk. There are no components and no design-time properties here: every row below is a function or procedure you call directly. Full source code ships in every license. Anchors below take you to the six capability families the units fall into.
sgcCrypto has no components. The 43 units below export plain functions, there is no Tsgc* class and no sgcCrypto_Reg.pas. Add a unit to your uses clause and call the function.
Already included. sgcCrypto ships free inside sgcWebSockets Standard, Professional and Enterprise, and inside All-Access. It is also sold standalone (bundling the sgcWebSockets Core runtime) for customers who only own Core. See Pricing.
AES, CCM, ChaCha20, Poly1305, 5 units
SHA-2/3, BLAKE2, Argon2, 11 units
Ed25519, X25519, Schnorr, RSA, 10 units
X.509, ASN.1, RSA & EC CSR, 5 units
ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, 6 units
HOTP/TOTP, encoding, ZIP AES, 6 units
Every sgcCrypto_*.pas unit under sgcWebSockets/delphi/Source/, grouped by family.
| Unit | Family | What it does |
|---|---|---|
sgcCrypto_AES | Symmetric | AES-CBC, AES-GCM (AEAD), AES-CTR. |
sgcCrypto_Modes | Symmetric | AES-ECB, OFB, CFB, CTS, CCM (AEAD), Key Wrap / Key Wrap with Padding, and the seven padding schemes. |
sgcCrypto_CMAC | Symmetric | AES-CMAC and AES-GMAC message authentication. |
sgcCrypto_ChaCha | Symmetric | ChaCha20, XChaCha20, Salsa20, XSalsa20. |
sgcCrypto_Poly1305 | Symmetric | Poly1305 MAC, ChaCha20-Poly1305 and XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. |
sgcCrypto_SHA2 | Hashing & KDF | SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. |
sgcCrypto_Keccak | Hashing & KDF | SHA-3, SHAKE128/256, cSHAKE, KMAC. |
sgcCrypto_Blake2b | Hashing & KDF | BLAKE2b, keyed or unkeyed. |
sgcCrypto_Blake2s | Hashing & KDF | BLAKE2s, keyed or unkeyed. |
sgcCrypto_HMAC | Hashing & KDF | HMAC-SHA1/256/384/512. |
sgcCrypto_KDF | Hashing & KDF | PBKDF2, KDF1, KDF2 and X9.63, selectable hash. |
sgcCrypto_HKDF | Hashing & KDF | HKDF extract-and-expand. |
sgcCrypto_Scrypt | Hashing & KDF | scrypt memory-hard KDF. |
sgcCrypto_Argon2 | Hashing & KDF | Argon2d, Argon2i, Argon2id. |
sgcCrypto_SipHash | Hashing & KDF | SipHash-2-4 keyed hash. |
sgcCrypto_TLSH | Hashing & KDF | TLSH fuzzy hash and similarity diff. |
sgcCrypto_Ed25519 | Signatures & key exchange | Ed25519 sign / verify. |
sgcCrypto_X25519 | Signatures & key exchange | X25519 Diffie-Hellman. |
sgcCrypto_Ed448 | Signatures & key exchange | Ed448 sign / verify. |
sgcCrypto_X448 | Signatures & key exchange | X448 Diffie-Hellman. |
sgcCrypto_GF448 | Signatures & key exchange | Internal GF(2^448-2^224-1) field arithmetic for Ed448/X448. |
sgcCrypto_ECCurves | Signatures & key exchange | ECDSA / ECDH over secp256k1, Brainpool P256r1/P384r1/P512r1 and NIST P-256/P-384/P-521, DER signatures, key export/import, and BIP-340 Schnorr. |
sgcCrypto_EC | Signatures & key exchange | General EC sign/verify as JWS (ES256/384/512), ECDH. |
sgcCrypto_RSA | Signatures & key exchange | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 sign, PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS verify, from PEM or raw. |
sgcCrypto_RSA_Keys | Signatures & key exchange | RSA keygen, OAEP (with independent MGF1 hash), PSS, PKCS#1 v1.5 sign/verify/encrypt/decrypt, PKCS#1 and PKCS#8 DER/PEM export and import. |
sgcCrypto_ECIES | Signatures & key exchange | ECIES seal / open hybrid encryption over X25519. |
sgcCrypto_ASN1 | PKI | DER reader, PEM codec, PKCS#1/SEC 1 key parsing. |
sgcCrypto_DER | PKI | DER writer primitives. |
sgcCrypto_BigInteger | PKI | Internal arbitrary-precision integer arithmetic. |
sgcCrypto_X509 | PKI | X.509 parse, verify, chain, CRL, revocation. |
sgcCrypto_X509_Gen | PKI | Self-signed certificate and PKCS#10 CSR generation, RSA or EC signed, with URI subject alternative names. |
sgcCrypto_MLKEM | Post-quantum | ML-KEM key encapsulation (FIPS 203), 3 parameter sets. |
sgcCrypto_MLKEM_Poly | Post-quantum | Internal polynomial ring arithmetic behind ML-KEM. |
sgcCrypto_MLKEM_Hybrid | Post-quantum | Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM key encapsulation. |
sgcCrypto_MLDSA | Post-quantum | ML-DSA digital signatures (FIPS 204), 3 parameter sets. |
sgcCrypto_MLDSA_Poly | Post-quantum | Internal polynomial ring arithmetic behind ML-DSA. |
sgcCrypto_SLHDSA | Post-quantum | SLH-DSA signatures (FIPS 205), 6 SHAKE parameter sets. |
sgcCrypto_OTP | OTP & misc | HOTP, TOTP, constant-time verify window. |
sgcCrypto_Encoding | OTP & misc | Constant-time compare, secure zero, hex/Base64url/Base32. |
sgcCrypto_Zip_AE2 | OTP & misc | WinZip AES encryption for ZIP entries, AE-1 / AE-2. |
sgcCrypto_Legacy | OTP & misc | MD4, MD5, HMAC-MD5, DES-ECB, RIPEMD-160 and HMAC-RIPEMD160, for interoperability only. |
sgcCrypto_Random | OTP & misc | Cross-platform CSPRNG. |
sgcCrypto_Int64 | OTP & misc | Internal 64-bit integer emulation for Delphi 7. |
AES in the modes production code actually uses, plus the ChaCha20/Poly1305 AEAD family.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| AES-CBC | sgcAES_CBC_Encrypt / sgcAES_CBC_Decrypt | PKCS#7 padding, 16-byte IV. Key length selects the cipher: 16/24/32 bytes = AES-128/192/256. |
| AES-CBC, no padding | sgcAES_CBC_Encrypt_NoPad / sgcAES_CBC_Decrypt_NoPad | The mode Java writes as AES/CBC/NoPadding. The input must already be a multiple of 16 bytes; an unaligned input raises instead of being silently padded into something the other side cannot read. |
| AES-GCM (AEAD) | sgcAES_GCM_Encrypt / sgcAES_GCM_Decrypt | 12-byte IV recommended. 16-byte tag, compared in constant time; decrypt returns False and empty plaintext on a failed tag. |
| AES-CCM (AEAD) | sgcAES_CCM_Encrypt / sgcAES_CCM_Decrypt | The AEAD constrained and IoT stacks specify, Zigbee, 802.15.4, Bluetooth and the TLS CCM suites, because it needs only the block cipher and no GHASH table. Nonce 7 to 13 bytes, tag 4 to 16 bytes, verified in constant time. |
| AES-CTR | sgcAES_CTR | SRTP-style AES-CM (RFC 3711). Symmetric call, no padding, 128-bit big-endian counter. |
| AES-ECB | sgcAES_ECB_Encrypt / sgcAES_ECB_Decrypt | No IV, no chaining. Included for interoperability with formats that specify it. |
| Padding schemes | sgcPad_Add / sgcPad_Remove, sgcAES_CBC_EncryptPad / DecryptPad, sgcAES_ECB_EncryptPad / DecryptPad | TsgcPadding covers None, PKCS#7, Zero, ANSI X9.23, ISO 7816-4, ISO 10126-2 and TBC, so CBC and ECB can read and write data from a system that did not choose PKCS#7. sgcPad_Remove returns False down the same path for every kind of bad pad. |
| AES-OFB / AES-CFB | sgcAES_OFB, sgcAES_CFB_Encrypt / sgcAES_CFB_Decrypt | Stream-cipher-style feedback modes. |
| AES-CTS | sgcAES_CTS_Encrypt / sgcAES_CTS_Decrypt | Ciphertext stealing: encrypts data not a multiple of the block size with no padding overhead. |
| AES Key Wrap | sgcAES_KeyWrap / sgcAES_KeyUnwrap | RFC 3394, for wrapping one key under another. |
| AES Key Wrap with Padding | sgcAES_KeyWrapPad / sgcAES_KeyUnwrapPad | RFC 5649, for key material not a multiple of 8 bytes. |
| AES-CMAC | sgcAES_CMAC / sgcAES_CMAC_Verify | RFC 4493 message authentication code. |
| AES-GMAC | sgcAES_GMAC / sgcAES_GMAC_Verify | GCM's authentication-only mode: the whole message travels as additional data, nothing is encrypted. The IV must never repeat under one key, and the 16-byte tag is compared in constant time. |
| Low-level block primitives | sgcAES_ExpandKey, sgcAES_EncryptBlock, sgcAES_DecryptBlock | Exposed for the mode and MAC units above; call these directly only to build a mode not already provided. |
| ChaCha20 | sgcChaCha20 | RFC 8439, 96-bit nonce, 32-bit counter. |
| XChaCha20 | sgcXChaCha20 | 192-bit extended nonce, safe for random nonce generation at scale. |
| Salsa20 / XSalsa20 | sgcSalsa20 / sgcXSalsa20 | The predecessor stream cipher family, both nonce sizes. |
| Subkey derivation | sgcHChaCha20 / sgcHSalsa20 | What the X-variants use internally to derive a subkey from the first 16 nonce bytes. |
| Poly1305 MAC | sgcPoly1305 / sgcPoly1305_Verify | One-time authenticator, RFC 8439. Never reuse a Poly1305 key. |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD | sgcChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt / _Decrypt | The AEAD cipher behind TLS 1.3's second cipher suite and SSH. |
| XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD | sgcXChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt / _Decrypt | Same AEAD, 192-bit nonce, the construction libsodium calls crypto_aead_xchacha20poly1305_ietf. |
Every mainstream hash family, plus PBKDF2, HKDF, scrypt and all three Argon2 variants.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SHA-1 / SHA-2 | sgcSHA1, sgcSHA224, sgcSHA256, sgcSHA384, sgcSHA512 | FIPS 180-4. SHA-1 is kept for interoperability, not recommended for new signatures. |
| SHA-3 | sgcSHA3_224 / _256 / _384 / _512 | FIPS 202, the Keccak sponge, structurally independent from SHA-2. |
| SHAKE128 / SHAKE256 | sgcSHAKE128 / sgcSHAKE256 | Extendable-output functions: request any digest length. |
| cSHAKE128 / cSHAKE256 | sgcCSHAKE128 / sgcCSHAKE256 | Domain-separated SHAKE, NIST SP 800-185, the basis for KMAC. |
| KMAC128 / KMAC256 | sgcKMAC128 / sgcKMAC256 | Keccak-based MAC with a variable output length. |
| BLAKE2b | sgcBlake2b / sgcBlake2b_Keyed | RFC 7693, digests up to 64 bytes, built-in keying (no separate HMAC needed). |
| BLAKE2s | sgcBlake2s / sgcBlake2s_Keyed | RFC 7693, digests up to 32 bytes, tuned for 32-bit platforms. |
| Streaming digests | sgcBlake2b_Init/_Update/_Final, matching calls on Keccak/Blake2s | For hashing data too large to hold in memory at once. |
| HMAC | sgcHMAC_SHA1 / _SHA256 / _SHA384 / _SHA512 | RFC 2104 keyed hashing over the SHA-1/2 family. |
| RIPEMD-160 / HMAC-RIPEMD160 | sgcRIPEMD160, sgcHMAC_RIPEMD160 | ISO/IEC 10118-3 and RFC 2286. The 160-bit digest Bitcoin addresses layer over SHA-256, and the one OpenPGP names. |
| PBKDF2 | sgcPBKDF2, sgcPBKDF2_SHA1 / _SHA256 / _SHA512 | RFC 8018. Only mildly memory-hard; prefer Argon2id or scrypt when you can choose. |
| HKDF | sgcHKDF_Extract_SHA256 / _SHA384, sgcHKDF_Expand_SHA256 / _SHA384, sgcHKDF_SHA256 / _SHA384 | RFC 5869, extract-then-expand key derivation, the standard way to turn a shared secret into several keys. |
| KDF1 / KDF2 / X9.63 | sgcKDF1, sgcKDF2, sgcKDF_X963 | The counter-mode derivations ISO 18033-2, IEEE 1363a and ANSI X9.63 define, which is what RSA-KEM and ECIES name. KDF1 counts from 0 and KDF2 from 1, a difference that has caused real interoperability bugs, so check which one your spec means. |
| scrypt | sgcScrypt | RFC 7914, memory-hard, resists GPU/ASIC attack far better than PBKDF2. |
| Argon2 | sgcArgon2 (d / i / id), sgcArgon2id convenience wrapper | RFC 9106, the Password Hashing Competition winner. Full interface with optional secret (pepper) and associated data. |
| SipHash-2-4 | sgcSipHash24 / sgcSipHash24_Value | Fast keyed PRF for hash-table keys, resists hash-flooding denial of service. |
| TLSH fuzzy hash | sgcTLSH, sgcTLSH_Init/_Update/_Final | Locality-sensitive hash for near-duplicate detection, not a cryptographic digest. |
| TLSH similarity score | sgcTLSH_Diff | Distance between two TLSH digests; lower means more similar. |
Sign, verify and derive shared secrets across five distinct curve families plus RSA.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 sign / verify | sgcEd25519_Sign / sgcEd25519_Verify | RFC 8032. 32-byte public key, 64-byte signature. Verify rejects non-canonical points and S >= L per section 5.1.7. |
| X25519 key exchange | sgcX25519, sgcX25519_PublicKey, sgcX25519_SharedSecret | RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman over Curve25519. |
| Ed448 sign / verify | sgcEd448_GenerateKeyPair, sgcEd448_Sign, sgcEd448_Verify | RFC 8032, the 448-bit (Goldilocks) EdDSA curve. |
| X448 key exchange | sgcX448, sgcX448_PublicKey, sgcX448_SharedSecret | RFC 7748 Diffie-Hellman over Curve448. |
| secp256k1 | sgcECDSA_SignHash / VerifyHash with eccSecp256k1 | The Bitcoin/Ethereum curve, SEC 2, in sgcCrypto_ECCurves. |
| Brainpool P256r1 / P384r1 / P512r1 | same functions with eccBrainpoolP256r1 / P384r1 / P512r1 | RFC 5639, common in EU eIDAS and government profiles. |
| NIST P-256 / P-384 / P-521 | same functions with eccP256 / eccP384 / eccP521 | TsgcECCurve now names seven curves, so key generation, signing, verification, ECDH and point compression all reach the NIST prime curves from raw key bytes, not only from a PEM file. |
| Deterministic ECDSA nonce | built into sgcECDSA_SignHash | RFC 6979: the nonce is derived from the private key and message, no RNG failure mode. |
| ECDH (secp256k1 / Brainpool) | sgcECDH_SharedSecret | Shared secret over the same four curves. |
| Point compression | sgcEC_Compress / sgcEC_Decompress | Store or transmit the shorter compressed public-key form. |
| EC as JWS (ES256/384/512) | sgcECDSA_SignJWS / sgcECDSA_VerifyJWS | Curve selected automatically from the requested bit length, sign/verify directly from a PEM key, JOSE-oriented sibling of ECCurves. |
| Generic ECDH | sgcECDH | Shared secret from a raw private key and peer public point. |
| Raw / DER ECDSA verify | sgcECDSA_VerifyRaw / sgcECDSA_VerifyDER | Verify against a raw (Qx, Qy, r, s) tuple or a DER-encoded signature. |
| DER ECDSA signing & conversion | sgcECDSA_SignDER / sgcECDSA_VerifyDER, sgcECDSA_RawToDER / sgcECDSA_DERToRaw | X.509, CMS and TLS carry the DER ECDSA-Sig-Value, a SEQUENCE of INTEGER r then INTEGER s. JOSE and WebAuthn carry the raw R || S pair instead. Sign straight into either form, or convert an existing signature between them. |
| Schnorr signatures (BIP-340) | sgcSchnorr_PublicKey, sgcSchnorr_Sign, sgcSchnorr_Verify | secp256k1 only, with x-only 32-byte public keys and 64-byte signatures: what Taproot, Nostr and Lightning use. sgcSchnorr_TaggedHash is exposed so the BIP-341 and BIP-342 tags can be built on the same construction. |
| RSA sign (PKCS#1 v1.5) | sgcRSA_SignPKCS1 | From a PEM private key, SHA-1/256/384/512 digest. |
| RSA verify (PKCS#1 v1.5 / PSS) | sgcRSA_VerifyPKCS1, sgcRSA_VerifyPSS, and _Raw variants over a modulus/exponent | RFC 8017. Verify works from a PEM key or raw modulus and exponent, no key-object construction required. |
| RSA key generation | sgcRSA_GenerateKey | Any requested bit length, Miller-Rabin primality testing. |
| RSA-OAEP encryption | sgcRSA_OAEP_Encrypt / sgcRSA_OAEP_Decrypt | RFC 8017 optimal asymmetric encryption padding. |
| RSA-OAEP with an independent MGF1 hash | the five-parameter sgcRSA_OAEP_Encrypt / sgcRSA_OAEP_Decrypt overloads | Pin the label hash and the MGF1 hash separately. OAEPWithSHA256AndMGF1Padding means SHA-256 for both in Bouncy Castle but SHA-256 with MGF1-SHA1 in SunJCE, and that mismatch is the usual reason Java interoperability fails. |
| RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption | sgcRSA_PKCS1_Encrypt / sgcRSA_PKCS1_Decrypt | RFC 8017 section 7.2, the mode Java names RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding. Decrypt takes the same path for every failure so it gives a padding oracle nothing to work with. Prefer OAEP for anything new. |
| RSA-PSS / PKCS#1 signing | sgcRSA_PSS_Sign / Verify, sgcRSA_PKCS1_Sign / Verify | Sign directly from a generated TsgcRSAPrivateKey. |
| RSA key export | sgcRSA_ExportPrivateKeyPEM, sgcRSA_ExportPublicKeyPEM, matching DER calls | PKCS#1 and SubjectPublicKeyInfo encodings. |
| PKCS#8 and SEC 1 key export | sgcRSA_ExportPrivateKeyPKCS8DER / PKCS8PEM, sgcEC_ExportPrivateKeyPKCS8DER / PKCS8PEM, sgcEC_ExportPrivateKeySEC1DER / SEC1PEM, sgcEC_ExportSubjectPublicKeyInfo, sgcEC_ExportPublicKeyPEM | The BEGIN PRIVATE KEY container Java, .NET and most modern tooling expect, alongside the SEC 1 BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY form and the SubjectPublicKeyInfo a certificate embeds. Unencrypted, so what comes back is bare key material. |
| RSA and EC key import | sgcRSA_ImportPrivateKeyDER / PEM, sgcRSA_ImportPublicKeyDER / PEM, sgcEC_ImportPrivateKeyDER / PEM, sgcEC_ImportPublicKeyDER / PEM | This did not exist before: a generated key could be written out but never read back in. Import accepts PKCS#1, PKCS#8, SEC 1 and SubjectPublicKeyInfo, DER or PEM, recomputes the CRT parameters or the public point when the file omits them, and returns False on malformed input rather than raising, so untrusted files are safe to hand it. |
| ECIES seal / open | sgcECIES_GenerateKeyPair, sgcECIES_Seal, sgcECIES_Open | Hybrid encryption to an X25519 public key: ephemeral ECDH plus an AEAD, one call each way. |
Read a certificate someone else issued, or generate one yourself, with a DER encoder and decoder underneath both.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| DER reader | sgcASN1_Read, sgcASN1_Next, sgcASN1_Content | Walks a DER structure node by node. |
| PEM codec | sgcPEM_Decode / sgcPEM_Encode | RFC 7468, the -----BEGIN ... -----END wrapper around DER. |
| RSA key parsing | sgcASN1_ParseRSAPrivateKey / PublicKey | PKCS#1 (RFC 8017) key structures. |
| EC key parsing | sgcASN1_ParseECPrivateKey / PublicKey | SEC 1 key structures. |
| DER writer, structural | sgcDER_Sequence, sgcDER_Set, sgcDER_Tagged, sgcDER_ContextExplicit / Implicit | The building blocks every certificate field is assembled from. |
| DER writer, values | sgcDER_Integer, sgcDER_OctetString, sgcDER_BitString, sgcDER_Boolean, sgcDER_Null | Primitive value encoders. |
| DER writer, strings & identifiers | sgcDER_OID, sgcDER_UTF8String, sgcDER_PrintableString, sgcDER_IA5String, sgcDER_Time | Object identifiers, the three string types X.509 uses, and UTCTime/GeneralizedTime. |
| Certificate parsing | sgcX509_Parse | Full certificate structure: subject, issuer, validity, public key, extensions. |
| Signature / chain verification | sgcX509_VerifySignedBy, sgcX509_VerifyChain | Verify one certificate against an issuer, or walk and verify an array of DER certificates. |
| CRL parsing & revocation | sgcX509_CRL_Parse, sgcX509_IsRevoked, sgcX509_CRL_VerifySignedBy | Parse a Certificate Revocation List and check a serial number against it. |
| Name formatting | sgcX509_SubjectRFC2253, sgcX509_IssuerRFC2253, sgcX509_SubjectOneLine | RFC 2253 distinguished-name strings, for logging and display. |
| Extensions & SANs | sgcX509_GetExtension, sgcX509_GetCRLDistributionURIs | Read arbitrary extension OIDs and CRL distribution point URIs. |
| Self-signed certificate generation | sgcX509_CreateSelfSigned | Full TsgcX509Options: subject DN, validity window, serial number, CA flag with path-length constraint, key usage, extended key usage, subject alternative names (including IPv4 SANs). |
| URI subject alternative names | TsgcX509Options.URIs | uniformResourceIdentifier SANs, for a SPIFFE-style service identity rather than a host name. The value is written verbatim as IA5String content, so pass a full URI. |
| PKCS#10 CSR generation | sgcX509_CreateCSR | RFC 2986 certificate signing request from the same options record. |
| EC-signed certificates & CSRs | sgcX509_CreateSelfSignedEx, sgcX509_CreateCSREx, sgcX509_ECKey, sgcX509_RSAKey | Sign with an EC key as well as RSA by wrapping either one in a TsgcX509SignKey. An EC certificate is roughly a third the size of an RSA one and verifies far faster. TsgcX509Options.Hash still names only the SHA, the algorithm follows the key, so rhSHA256 with an EC key means ecdsa-with-SHA256. |
| PEM output | sgcX509_ToPEM | Wraps the generated DER as a ready-to-save PEM file. |
The three algorithms NIST finalized in August 2024 as FIPS 203, 204 and 205, plus a hybrid combiner for the migration period.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| ML-KEM key generation | sgcMLKEM_GenerateKeyPair, sgcMLKEM_GenerateKeyPairFromSeed | FIPS 203, formerly Kyber. Three parameter sets: mlkem512, mlkem768, mlkem1024. |
| ML-KEM encapsulate | sgcMLKEM_Encapsulate, sgcMLKEM_EncapsulateWithSeed | Produces a fresh 32-byte shared secret and the ciphertext that carries it. |
| ML-KEM decapsulate | sgcMLKEM_Decapsulate | Never fails: a malformed ciphertext yields a pseudorandom secret (implicit rejection) instead of an error, so timing and error behavior reveal nothing. |
| ML-KEM sizes | sgcMLKEM_PublicKeySize, PrivateKeySize, CiphertextSize, SharedSecretSize | Byte lengths per parameter set, for buffer sizing. |
| Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM | sgcHybrid_GenerateKeyPair, sgcHybrid_Encapsulate, sgcHybrid_Decapsulate | Combines a classical and a post-quantum shared secret through a KDF, so the result is never weaker than X25519 alone. The recommended way to deploy ML-KEM today. |
| ML-DSA key generation | sgcMLDSA_GenerateKeyPair, sgcMLDSA_GenerateKeyPairFromSeed | FIPS 204, formerly Dilithium. Three parameter sets: mldsa44, mldsa65, mldsa87. |
| ML-DSA sign / verify | sgcMLDSA_Sign / sgcMLDSA_Verify | Deterministic or randomized signing per the FIPS 204 interface, plus a context string. |
| ML-DSA sizes | sgcMLDSA_PublicKeySize, PrivateKeySize, SignatureSize | Byte lengths per parameter set. |
| SLH-DSA key generation | sgcSLHDSA_GenerateKeyPair, sgcSLHDSA_GenerateKeyPairFromSeed | FIPS 205, formerly SPHINCS+. Stateless hash-based signatures: security rests on the hash function alone, not on a lattice or curve assumption. |
| SLH-DSA sign / verify | sgcSLHDSA_Sign / sgcSLHDSA_Verify | Six SHAKE parameter sets: slhShake128s, slhShake128f, slhShake192s, slhShake192f, slhShake256s, slhShake256f. The s sets favor small signatures, the f sets favor fast signing. |
| SLH-DSA sizes & naming | sgcSLHDSA_PublicKeySize, PrivateKeySize, SignatureSize, sgcSLHDSA_ParamsName | SLH-DSA signatures are large (7.8 KB to 49 KB depending on the set); size the buffer before you sign. |
sgcCrypto does not claim ed25519187 or SPECK. ed25519187 has no published specification, and SPECK was withdrawn from ISO standardization in 2018; neither is implemented here.
The utility layer: one-time codes, the encodings every other family leans on, and WinZip AES encryption.
| Capability | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| HOTP | sgcHOTP | RFC 4226, counter-based one-time password. |
| TOTP | sgcTOTP, sgcTOTP_FromBase32 | RFC 6238, time-based one-time password; the Base32 variant accepts the secret exactly as an authenticator app displays it. |
| TOTP verification | sgcTOTP_Verify | Checks a submitted code across a window of steps in constant time, so neither the result nor its position leaks through timing. Does not itself stop replay; the caller tracks used codes. |
| Constant-time compare | sgcConstantTimeEquals | Used throughout the library for tag and MAC comparisons. |
| Secure zero | sgcSecureZero | Overwrites a byte buffer so key material does not linger in memory. |
| Hex | sgcHexEncode / sgcHexDecode | Lower-case hex, case-insensitive decode. |
| Base64url | sgcBase64UrlEncode / sgcBase64UrlDecode | RFC 4648 section 5, unpadded, the encoding JWT and JOSE use. |
| Base32 | sgcBase32Encode / sgcBase32Decode | RFC 4648 section 6, the encoding TOTP secrets and authenticator apps use. |
| WinZip AES key derivation | sgcZipAE2_DeriveKeys | PBKDF2-based key, authentication key and password verifier from a password and salt. |
| WinZip AES encrypt / decrypt | sgcZipAE2_Encrypt / sgcZipAE2_Decrypt | AE-1 and AE-2, AES-128/192/256, per-entry salt sizing via TsgcZipAESStrength. |
| WinZip entry packing | sgcZipAE2_PackEntry / sgcZipAE2_UnpackEntry | Combines salt, verifier, ciphertext and authentication code into the on-disk layout. |
| WinZip extra field | sgcZipAE2_BuildExtraField / sgcZipAE2_ParseExtraField | The 0x9901 extra field that marks a ZIP entry as AES-encrypted. |
| Legacy hashes (interop only) | sgcMD4, sgcMD5, sgcHMAC_MD5 | Kept for reading older formats and protocols; do not use in a new design. |
| Legacy cipher (interop only) | sgcDES_EncryptECB / sgcDES_DecryptECB, sgcDES_NTLM7to8 | DES-ECB and the DES-based NTLM key-expansion step, both withdrawn (FIPS 46-3), kept for legacy interoperability. |
| Secure random bytes | sgcRandomBytes / sgcRandomFill | Windows CryptoAPI under MSWINDOWS, /dev/urandom elsewhere, one call either way. |
What is supported, stated precisely.
| Area | Detail |
|---|---|
| Operating system | No MSWINDOWS guard, or any other platform guard, wraps SGC_CRYPTO in sgcVer.inc. All 43 units compile for Win32, Win64, Linux64, macOS, iOS and Android. |
| Random number source | The one platform-aware unit, sgcCrypto_Random, selects a CSPRNG per target: the Windows CryptoAPI under MSWINDOWS, /dev/urandom on POSIX targets, behind the same sgcRandomBytes call. |
| Delphi | Delphi 7 through RAD Studio 13 Florence. No native 64-bit integer type is assumed anywhere: sgcCrypto_Int64 and the TsgcBigInt type in sgcCrypto_BigInteger emulate the arithmetic the hashes, curves and post-quantum units need. |
| C++ Builder | C++ Builder through the generated headers, same source tree. |
| Design-time footprint | None. There is no sgcCrypto_Reg.pas, nothing is RegisterComponents'd, and no unit appears on a component palette page. |
| Dependencies | No OpenSSL binding, no external DLL. Every primitive is implemented directly in Object Pascal inside the unit you reference. |
| Source code | Full Object Pascal source in every paid tier, and in the edition packages that already include sgcCrypto. |
| Redistribution | Binaries you build are royalty free, with no per-seat or per-server runtime fee. |